

Parties and Leaders in Senate Decision Making

C. Lawrence Evans

Department of Government
College of William & Mary
Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795

Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago, IL, April 4-7, 2019

Parties and Leaders in Senate Decision Making

This paper reports on a research program about member decision making on important roll call votes in the U.S. Senate. The subject of the broader study is the mechanisms through which mass constituents, advocacy groups, party organizations and leaders, the White House, and the personal policy attitudes of legislators and other aspects of the decision context shape roll call choices on major issues. The empirical focus is twenty significant policy matters considered on the Senate floor during the 106th Congress, 1999-2000.

The overarching goal of the project is to address important disjunctures that have emerged within contemporary scholarship about American politics. For one, studies of roll call choice and other normatively consequential aspects of congressional behavior generally treat lawmakers as agents who largely respond to a range of principals, including their constituents. In contrast, the last two decades of public opinion research emphasizes the malleability of mass attitudes to elite priming, including the public behavior of elected officials like Senators. And influential studies of group behavior, from Bauer, Poole and Dexter (1963) to Baumgartner et al. (2009), likewise emphasize that advocacy coalitions respond to members of Congress and that lawmakers are far more than mere agents for interest group principals. Importantly, political theorists, such as Pitkin (1972), Mansbridge (2003), and Disch (2012), portray representational relationships as complex, reciprocal, and performative. One premise for this project is that important new light can be shed on the representational behavior of U.S. Senators by examining their voting decisions up-close, in detail, and from the perspective of inside the office enterprise. How do participants in the decision-making process perceive the pressures, incentives, and opportunities that they confront as members make up their minds about how to vote in the chamber?

Along those lines, over the past several decades considerable scholarly ink has been devoted to the impact exerted by parties and leaders in the lawmaking process. Partisan polarization has ramped up in both chambers of Congress, to be sure, and by most accounts leaders now play a more pronounced role in the day-to-day operations of the House and Senate. But scholars continue to disagree about the extent to which partisan divisions and enhanced leadership activity are indicative of party influence, as well as the form that influence might take (Smith 2007 includes a superb overview). Much of the problem here concerns measurement. It is important not to overgeneralize, but perhaps the standard approach has been to (1) identify some form of legislative behavior that

may be conditioned by party, (2) gather evidence about the distribution of this behavior across members or over time, and (3) regress such variables on some combination of explanatory factors that includes partisan affiliation and roll-call based indicators of member ideological “preferences.” Almost by design such preference measures are endogenous to party, as well as just about every other factor that can affect how lawmakers behave. Not surprisingly, then, it has been extremely difficult for empirical researchers to identify partisan effects above and beyond member preferences so-called. As with representational relationships more generally, considerable insight into the nature of party and leadership influence in Congress can be secured by opening up the black box of member decision making and examining roll call choice from the perspective of the office enterprise.

In this paper, as well as the broader research program of which it is a part, the 106th Senate is the main period of study. There are three reasons. First, the 106th Congress constituted a transition of sorts between the less polarized chambers of the 1970s and 1980s and the intensely partisan Senates of recent years (Smith 2014, Theriault 2013). Major portions of the floor agenda during 1999-2000 were characterized by sharp infighting along partisan and ideological lines, the prioritization of position taking over lawmaking, and rampant gridlock. Other portions of the agenda, however, were more conducive to cross-partisan bargaining, compromise, and the passage of legislation. As a result, by considering member decision making on different subsets of the policy agenda of the 106th Congress, we can shed light on representational relationships across a range of partisan configurations. Indeed, a key finding is that many of the institutional ills that characterize the contemporary Senate were fully apparent during the late 1990s and are largely rooted in the relationships that individual members develop with the outside audiences and constituencies critical to their goals.

Second, during 1999-2000, I conducted nearly 100 interviews with senior staff (primarily Chiefs of Staff and Legislative Directors) for a sample of 36 members of the Senate. As part of the interviews, the aides were questioned extensively about the factors that shaped the choices of their Senators on contemporaneous roll calls on the chamber floor. More concretely, for each of 20 votes I gathered information about member decision making for a sample of 12 Senate offices equally divided by party, which resulted in fairly rich portraits of 240 discrete roll call decisions. The interview protocol was modeled on the questions employed by Kingdon (1973) in his classic study of member voting decisions in the House. A portion of this evidence was piloted in Evans (2002),

but the results of the interviews have yet to be fully leveraged. Most important, the evidence allows us to weigh the factors that shape roll call decisions from the perspective of the Senate office, rather than rely on statistical relationships between voting decisions and the standard measures of constituency interests, organizational activity, party affiliation, and so on that are pervasive in the empirical literature about representation.

Third, the passage of nearly two decades since the 106th Congress enables me to incorporate a valuable and underutilized evidentiary source for understanding the decision-making practices of Senators – the personal papers of former members of the chamber. Indeed, the vast majority of members included in my sample of Senate offices have retired, and in many instances their personal papers are now open to researchers. Included among these archival records are the strategy memos, mail counts, correspondence with outside groups, administration contacts, and other materials that staff collect as they advise Senators about how to deal with an upcoming issue. The archived papers of former members of the 106th Congress, in other words, allow me to recreate the paper trails that shed light on roll call choice. These materials also provide both a validity check on the interview evidence and the opportunity to delve into member decision making in significantly more detail. Moreover, while the interviews necessarily were conducted on a “not for attribution” basis, the personal papers of former members are public record and thus enhance the reproducibility of the project.

The focus of this paper is on the impact of parties and leaders on roll call choice. For now, the main source of evidence is the aforementioned interviews – information from the papers of former Senators will be integrated as the archival research progresses. Section 1 provides background about the 106th Senate and my research design. Section 2 presents descriptive information about partisanship and leadership activity on the measures included in the issue sample. Section 3 explores the relative importance of the factors that can shape the roll call choices of senators, including lobbying and other communications from party leaders. We next consider certain subsets of the larger issue sample for further insight into the impact of parties and leaders. In Section 4, we focus solely on the items where the leadership was a significant factor in member decision making, and examine differences by party. In Section 5, our attention turns to items where the leadership was not a major factor in the choice calculus of individual members, but (based on the evidence reported in Section 2) voting was still highly partisan or other signs existed that the leadership was consequential in some way. The final section concludes.

1. Preliminaries

When the Senate convened in January 1999, the chamber included 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats. The majority leader was Trent Lott, R-Miss., and the assistant floor leader and whip for the GOP was Don Nickles, R-Okla. On the Democratic side of the aisle, Tom Daschle, D-S.Dak., was the minority leader and Harry Reid, D-Nev., was the assistant floor leader and whip. Democrat Bill Clinton, of course, was serving the final two years of his eight year stretch in the White House. Within the Senate, Republicans and Democrats tended to represent substantially different kinds of states. For GOP Senators, the average vote for Clinton in 1996 within their states had been 50.6 percent, while for Democratic members the average had been 56.1 percent, for a difference of about 5.5 percentage points. For comparison, during the 101st Congress (1989-90), the percentage difference in state-level presidential voting between Senate Republicans and Democrats had been just 1.8 percent, while by the 115th Congress (2017-18) the analogous party difference had reached nearly 15 percent. For the 106th Congress, the number of members within each party hailing from states with Clinton support closer to the average for the partisan opposition provides a rough indicator of the number of lawmakers likely to be cross-pressured between party and constituency concerns. For the majority Republicans, 39.3 percent were party outliers in terms of state-level presidential voting, while the analogous percentage for chamber Democrats was 32.6. During 1999-2000, then, Senators tended to represent states that tilted toward their party, but a significant minority of both parties – and especially the majority GOP – confronted electorates that were more in line with the constituencies represented by the average member of the partisan opposition.

While polarization at the constituency level was significant, but not overwhelming, Republican and Democratic members of the 106th Senate produced markedly different roll call records on the floor. Among GOP Senators, for example, the average DW-NOMINATE value was .38, while for Democrats the average was -.34.¹ If we use the difference between the two party averages as a rough indicator of partisan polarization at the roll call level, then the partisan deviation for the 106th Congress was about .72 while the analogous deviations for the 101st and 113th Congresses were .60 and .93, respectively. Also instructive is the number of Senators with DW-NOMINATE values that were closer to the average for members of the other party than they

¹ DW-NOMINATE values used in this paper are from Voteview.com and are dynamic indicators current through the 113th Congress.

were to the average for their co-partisans. Interestingly, only a single member fell into that category in each of the 101st – 105th Congresses; three during the 106th and 107th; two in the 108th and 109th; one in the 110th; two in the 111th and 112th; and one in the 113th.²

In short, the 106th Senate was transitional in terms of both constituency level and roll call polarization. Overall, the level of partisan polarization appears to have been somewhat less marked at the constituency level (according to the presidential voting measure, at least), but stepped up substantially during the 1990s and 2000s. Roll call polarization was already significant by the late 1980s, and only became more so during the ensuing two decades. Still, the hallmarks of the contemporary Senate were already apparent by the 106th Congress, especially on portions of the policy agenda that divided the two parties. Indeed, if we exclude the Democrat Zell Miller, who only served for the last six months of 2000, there were no Senators located in the ideological overlap between the two parties during 1999-2000. In other words, excluding Miller, the most liberal Republican in the chamber was more conservative than the most rightward leaning Democrat.

Table 1 lists the issues from the floor agenda during the 106th Senate that were the subject of interviews for this project, while Table 2 denotes the Senate offices for which interviews were conducted and the number of items targeted per Senator. The issues were selected as the fieldwork ensued during 1999-2000. Typically, I followed media coverage of the Senate looking for upcoming and contemporaneous floor actions that appeared to be of consequence, and also spoke regularly with senior Senate staff about the unfolding agenda. As much as possible, interviews were conducted with a sample of Senate offices as close as possible to the occurrence of the relevant votes in the full chamber.

Again, for this portion of the larger study I rely on interviews conducted with top aides to a broadly representative sample of 36 U.S. Senators – primarily chiefs of staff and legislative directors – to explore how roll call decisions were made across the twenty floor issues. For each issue, I gathered data from twelve of the offices in the larger sample. The research design is based

² The three for the 106th Senate included James Jeffords, R-Vt., Lincoln Chafee, R-R.I., and Zell Miller, D-Ga. Interestingly, both Chafee and Miller replaced members who had recently died in office and only served for portions of the 106th Congress. More generally, if we consider the ranks of Senators more ideologically proximate to the average for the other party, from the 101st to the 113th Congress the same five names surface repeatedly – Jeffords, Chafee, Miller, and Republicans Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe of Maine.

on Kingdon's (1973) study of House roll call behavior during the late 1960s. As with Kingdon's research, the unit of analysis is the decision, so the total N for the interview-based portion of the project is 240 observations (twenty issues, 12 offices per issue, equally divided by party).

Unlike Kingdon, I chose not to use the members themselves as my main informants. There are several reasons. Relative to House members, it is much harder to secure interview time with sitting members of the Senate. The congressional workload has expanded substantially since Kingdon conducted his fieldwork, and scheduling interviews with lawmakers in both chambers is increasingly difficult. Perhaps more important, the decision-making process in the Senate is also more staff-dependent than is the analogous process in the House, in large part because the time of Senators is spread more thinly. In many ways, top aides are more likely to have intimate knowledge of the full range of pressures and considerations that shape position taking and roll call choice. Indeed, in previous research about Senate committee decision making during the 1980s, I found that the many Senators I interviewed often responded to detailed questions about bills by calling relevant legislative staff into the room and asking them to participate in the discussion (Evans 2001a). More generally, my strategy of relying on senior staff as informants is fully consistent with the view that the congressional office should be conceptualized as an "enterprise," with members at the helm (Salisbury and Shepsle, 1981). The strategy of using knowledgeable staff as informants about member behavior also has proven useful to other congressional researchers. Hall (1996), for instance, relied on staff respondents to gather systematic data about member motivations and behind-the-scenes legislative activity in his award-winning study of committee participation. Based on interviews at the staff level, Miler (2010) is able to gauge the impact of various subconstituencies within a sample of House districts on health and environmental issues. And in important new research, Hertel-Fernandez et al. (2019) utilize a survey of senior staffers to illuminate how congressional offices can misperceive constituent viewpoints, with implications for democratic theory.

My research design also diverges from Kingdon's work in certain other ways. Kingdon was able to randomly select his sample of House offices. In contrast, I mostly relied on personal contacts to assemble my Senate sample. Within each office, the primary goal was to secure access to a staff person privy to the relevant member's thinking and decision making for the specific policy matters under focus. It was important that the aides speak to me with some candor about how these decisions were made. Randomly selecting Senate offices would have produced less access and even

less candor. As a result, I chose to assemble the sample in a piece-meal fashion via personal contacts who could vouch for my trustworthiness.³

During the interviews, I took extensive notes, fleshed them out immediately after the relevant session, and then typed them up. As a result, it is possible to code a number of variables that tap into key elements of the decision-making process. Following Kingdon's lead, included are the importance of mass constituency opinion, advocacy organizations and interest groups, party leaders within the Senate, and the Clinton administration. From the interviews, it is possible to discern whether each of these factors was relevant to a member's decision making on an issue, and whether the importance of the factor was minor, moderate, or major. The interview protocol is summarized in the appendix, as are the coding criteria for the variables utilized in this paper.

Along with the aforementioned factors, also included among the decision touchstones were categories for "core attitudes" and "Senate colleagues." In the interviews, I did not systematically ask questions about the impact of a Senator's core policy attitudes on the voting decision. Still, it was clear during these conversations that members often approached a roll call choice by consciously relating the matter to their underlying ideology or core policy goals. On trade issues, for instance a number of my respondents emphasized the general free trade stances of their bosses, for example remarking, "that's a quota bill and we're against quotas." It is possible from the interview notes to roughly categorize the importance of a member's core policy attitudes and priorities to a roll call decision, and the associated criteria are likewise delineated in the appendix.

The category for "colleagues" is meant to capture the extent to which the positions chosen and votes cast were substantially affected by contacts with or information about the actions of other Senate offices. Prior behavioral studies of roll call choice emphasize that lawmakers often look to their colleagues for cues about how to vote. Such cues are selected in part because they provide resource-constrained lawmakers with low-cost information about the mix of constituency concerns, group pressures, partisan imperatives, White House priorities, and policy stakes confronting them on an upcoming vote (Kingdon 1973, Matthew and Stimson 1975). Although such signals largely proxy for other (more fundamental) political forces, they do reveal something about the process of decision making and are included among the factors, with coding specifics also provided in the appendix.

³ In particular, I relied heavily on the personal contacts of the late W. Lee Rawls, who was then serving as Chief of Staff to Senator Bill Frist, R-Tenn., and without whom this study could not have been conducted.

2. Twenty Measures: The Partisan Context

As mentioned, claims for party/leader effects in Congress often are based on the presence or absence of roll call polarization and indicators of leadership involvement in the legislative process. At issue is whether these patterns of leadership engagement and partisan behavior are causally linked. As a result, it makes sense to begin our exploration of leadership influence with indicators of roll call polarization and leadership activity for each of the twenty items included in the issue sample.

Table 3 provides a summary. The legislative items are denoted in column 1. Column 2 shows the “party difference” for each item (the absolute value of the difference between the percentage of Republicans and Democrats voting yes). For measures associated with just one roll call, the difference score is for that roll call alone, while for issues associated with multiple floor votes the entry is the average difference score across those roll calls. For instance, Senate action on the Patients’ Bill of Rights (an important health care proposal) encompassed twelve major amendments and a final passage roll call, ranging from a minimum party difference of 92.4 to a maximum of 98.2, and yielding an average difference of 94.4. The party difference measure is standard in the literature and can range from a low of zero (Republicans and Democrats voted alike) to a high of 100 (members of the two parties were diametrically opposed to one another). The average party difference score across all Senate roll calls during the 106th Congress was about 27.5, so voting on the items in my sample was somewhat more partisan overall, but considerable variation in polarization is still apparent in the table. Along those lines, for the broader roll call record of 1999-2000, the incidence of so-called party votes (a majority of one party voted contrary to a majority of the other) was about 56.6 percent. In Table 3, items that produced at least one party-line roll call are denoted by a √. Notice that 15 of the twenty measures (75 percent) could be associated with at least one party-line vote. Again, the sample items are somewhat more partisan than the Senate roll call record as a whole, but still exhibit considerable variation in the extent to which they divided members by party.

The last two columns of the table provide summary information about leadership activity levels across the twenty items. There are a number of viable ways to tap leadership involvement by bill. Sinclair (1994), for instance, relied on issue-specific coverage in the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* to chart enhanced leadership engagement in the House legislative process from the 1970s

to the 1990s. Curry (2015), in contrast, treats as a majority leadership priority any legislation dealing with issues emphasized in one of the first ten bills introduced in a two-year congress, which by precedent have been reserved for the Speaker. Here, I opt for more direct measures. First, as part of the contemporaneous interviews conducted for this project, I also met separately with the chief of staff to the Majority Republican Whip at the time, presented this individual with a list of the twenty measures, and asked about the level of GOP involvement on each. More concretely, I asked the aide to rate majority leadership engagement for each item on a five-point scale ranging from one (low) to five (high), with three indicating “medium” and two and four reflecting intermediary levels (denoted in the table by Low/Med and Med/High, respectively).⁴ As part of the questionnaire, the aide spoke at length about why particular involvement levels were assigned to individual measures, so the summary indicator reported in column 3 reflects detailed discussions about what the majority leadership did on each item.

As a check on the validity of the staff score, column 4 of the table denotes the number of formal whip counts conducted by the majority Republicans on each measure. As part of research reported in Evans (2018a), archival records were gathered of the whip checks conducted by Senate Republican leaders during the late 1990s and early 2000s.⁵ During the 106th Congress, the majority GOP conducted formal head counts on 36 distinct questions. Senate leaders tend to engage their whip operations when three conditions are met: the matter is relevant to the party agenda, there is at least the potential for significant internal unity, and the outcome is still in play (Evans 2018a). As a result, the subset of whipped matters should not be viewed as a proxy for the party agenda. Yet, whether or not a matter is subject to formal whip activity does provide additional evidence about leadership involvement. As the table indicates, five of the 20 items in my sample were directly the subject of majority whip counts. Importantly, four of the whipped items were associated with high leadership activity according to the summary measure of column 3, while the fifth fell in the medium category, which reinforces confidence in the validity of both indicators.

As you can see, there clearly is a relationship between the level of roll call polarization on an issue, on the one hand, and the two indicators of majority leadership engagement, on the other.

⁴ My thanks to Walter Oleszek for setting up the session and participating in the interview, which was conducted at the end of the second session of the 106th Congress. Unfortunately, it was not possible to schedule an analogous interview with aides to the minority whip.

⁵ Consult the appendix of Evans (2018a) for background information about sourcing and the nature of these records. At this point, archival records of Senate Democratic whip activity for 1999-2000 are unavailable.

The Patients' Bill of Rights, for example, had the highest party difference score across the twenty items and was also characterized by intensive leadership involvement based on the staff rating and the number of whip counts. The comprehensive tax cuts included in the FY2000 reconciliation package likewise were associated with strong roll call partisanship and high involvement by the leadership. In contrast, the measure with the lowest difference score, the extension of normal trade relations to China, had a leadership involvement score of low to medium and no whipping by the majority leadership, and the relatively nonpartisan sugar subsidy repeal likewise exhibited attenuated leadership activity and no discernable whip action. Still, there also are certain disjunctures between party voting and our measures of leadership activity. For example, while voting on the Northeast Dairy Compact was nonpartisan, the majority leadership was highly engaged according to the staff indicator. And on the amendment relating to hate crimes, members largely divided by party on the roll call, but the level of leadership engagement was judged to be low and no whip counts were conducted. Such discrepancies suggest that the relationship between leadership activity and roll call partisanship is more nuanced than suggested by standard conceptual accounts in the literature.

More generally, even strong correlations do not necessarily imply causality. Does enhanced leadership activity or extensive whipping increase roll call polarization by party? Or are the associations we observe between leadership lobbying and partisan voting a result of relationships both variables may have with other, more foundational causal factors, such as constituency viewpoints or interest group pressure? As Kingdon (1973, 11) summed up decades ago, "Party voting may be a function of some constituency factor, coalition support of different kinds, sanctions employed by legislative leaders, administrative pressure, cue-giving within the Congress, ideological similarity among fellow party members, and other possible factors or various combinations of them." Absent additional information, there is no way to know.

3. Partisan Factors and the Member Decision

A strength of the research designed employed in this project is that it can help us disentangle the consequences of the factors mentioned by Kingdon for roll call choice. More concretely, based on the extensive interviews conducted within member offices, it is possible to categorize the importance of such factors for each of the 240 roll call decisions under consideration here. Table 4 summarizes aggregate factor relevance across the entire sample. As you can see, mass constituents

(ordinary people, as opposed to the leaders of organized groups) were cited as a major factor in about one-third of the decisions, of moderate importance for about one-third, and of minor or no importance for the remaining third. Organized advocacy groups, in contrast, were a major factor for nearly one-half of the 240 decisions, of moderate importance for a little under one-third, and a minor factor for just under twenty percent. Group considerations, in other words, tended to be more prominent in the member's decision calculus than was the case for mass public opinion. Across members and issues, it should be emphasized, the specific advocacy organizations that get mentioned almost always have a major presence in the state of the relevant lawmaker. The substantial weight placed on advocacy organizations within Senate offices reflects a degree of member responsiveness to local interests.

Likewise, a member's core attitudes and personal policy priorities were mentioned as a major factor for roughly one-half of the observations, of moderate importance for about 28 percent, and of minor importance for the remaining 23 percent. Recall that I did not ask staff respondents explicitly about the importance of a member's underlying policy concerns, in part to avoid loading the evidence. Yet, from comments made during the interviews it was fairly straightforward to detect situations where such concerns were part of the decision calculus. Based on the coding criteria summarized in the appendix, members regularly relied on their broader policy views for guidance about how to make voting decisions. And since member policy priorities themselves are often rooted in the concerns and priorities of constituent audiences, the significant importance of core attitudes is likewise consistent with member responsiveness to state interests.

As Table 4 indicates, for these members and this subset of the floor agenda, the White House and other Senate colleagues were less important considerations than were mass constituents, advocacy groups, or a lawmaker's core attitudes. It comes as no surprise that any impact exerted by the White House of Democrat Bill Clinton would be muted among Republican Senators. Indeed, cases where the administration was of moderate or major importance almost entirely were for Democratic members. But even on that side of the partisan aisle, the reach of the executive branch was fairly limited. According to many staff respondents, one reason was the impeachment trial that opened the 106th Congress. Clinton was weakened politically by fallout from the Monica Lewinsky scandal, House impeachment in 1998, and the highly publicized Senate trial of early 1999.

Based on the staff interviews, other Senate colleagues were a major factor in less than twenty percent of the member decisions, of moderate importance for another twenty percent, and of

minor to no importance for nearly sixty percent. By colleagues, I am referring to other Senate offices, excluding the leadership. In his interview-based study of member decision making in the House, Kingdon (1973) found that representatives regularly relied on colleagues outside the leadership as voting cues. Chamber colleagues, so the story goes, can serve as low-cost, accurate sources of information about the political consequences of a vote or position. For this reason, Kingdon maintained that interactions with colleagues constitute an indirect mechanism through which more foundational concerns may affect roll call behavior. In contrast to the 1960s House, however, Senate offices of the late 1990s were much larger, and Senators were more extensively staffed than were the House members interviewed by Kingdon three decades earlier. While roughly forty percent of the member decisions summarized in Table 4 still relied in part on input from chamber colleagues, a clear majority the relevant Senators made up their minds without heavily weighing or otherwise collaborating with other members. The result is fully consistent with claims by Sinclair (1989), Smith (2014), and other scholars about the individualistic nature of the modern Senate.

Of course, the column in Table 4 for “party leaders” is especially germane to the substantive focus of this paper. The twenty items in the issue sample, you will recall, were disproportionately associated with patterns of partisan roll call voting. According to top leadership staff, the level of involvement by Senate Republican leaders was medium to high for a majority of the measures. And a quarter were the subject of extensive whip activity by the majority GOP, including several that were associated with multiple whip checks. Yet, when we consider the impact of party leaders on decision making at the member level, the relevant leadership was only a major factor for about 11 percent of the 240 decisions, of moderate importance for about 23 percent, and of minor importance for nearly two-thirds.⁶

⁶ One possible criticism is that high-level staff may be reluctant to reference the impact of party leaders as a major factor in roll call choice for political reasons. There are several reasons such concerns are unfounded. For one, the member and staff samples were constructed with an eye toward promoting candor. Moreover, the question and coding criteria detailed in the appendix are concrete and issue specific. Rather than querying about the influence of leaders or other factors more generally, I asked about specific behaviors and considerations for a particular bill or vote, which is less likely to evoke broader reputational concerns among respondents. In addition, when we consider the legislative context of individual measures, the presence or absence of leadership effects (as captured in Tables 4 and 5) is mostly consistent with expectations. Indeed, such consistency should be fully apparent even in the abbreviated and exploratory presentations of this paper. Finally, the factor relevance data can also be juxtaposed with other indicators from local and national media accounts, the archived papers of rank-and-file Senators, evidence from the papers of former Senate leaders, and items included in the presidential records of Bill Clinton. As complementary measures are integrated into this research project, further steps will be taken to ensure the reliability and validity of the interview-based measures, but for now all indications are that the table entries reported in this paper are informative.

Table 5 summarizes the impact of party leaders by measure. Notice that these impacts are not broadly distributed across measures, but instead tend to cluster in certain issue areas. For the Patient's Bill of Rights and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act reauthorization, leaders were of major importance for five of the 12 decisions, of moderate importance for six, and of minor importance for just one. Leadership lobbying and overt partisan imperatives were clearly an important part of member decision making for these matters. Leadership effects were also pronounced for the emergency farm assistance bill, the massive tax cuts included in the FY 2000 reconciliation legislation, the minimum wage proposals, and (to lesser extents) campaign finance reform, the Y2K liability legislation, and the two targeted tax reductions (dealing with the marriage penalty and estate tax). For the remaining items, party leaders were not much of a factor at the member level. Indeed, for nine (nearly half of the issue sample), leadership effects on the roll call decision were almost entirely absent.

Aggregate indicators of roll call polarization or leadership activity, in other words, can distort inferences about the incidence of leadership influence at the member level. For a nontrivial subset of the 240 decisions under focus in this study, the leadership was of major or moderate importance. Even without the procedural and other institutional prerogatives extended to their House counterparts, Senate party leaders can be major factors in the voting calculations of rank-and-file members. But much of what appears at first blush to be leadership-induced partisanship in fact arises from other sources, especially constituency and group considerations. And there also are many cases where leaders do exert some influence during the process of position formation, but roll call partisanship and leadership engagement, overall, appear less pronounced.

4. Differences by Party

Further insight into leadership influence on roll call choice can be leveraged by breaking down the aggregate information in Table 5 by party. Were Republican and Democratic leaders of major importance on the same set of issues? Interestingly, the importance of party leaders is somewhat more pronounced overall on the *minority* side of the aisle. The differences are not large, but for the decisions made by Republicans, their leaders were a major factor for 10 percent, of moderate importance for 18.3 percent and of minor importance for 71.7 percent. On the Democratic side of the aisle, leaders were a major factor for 12.5 percent of the decisions, of moderate importance for 27.5 percent, and of minor importance for 60 percent.

It also is instructive to consider whether there are certain issues or measures for which leadership importance is disproportionate for one of the two political parties. Clearly, for the nearly one-half of the measures where leadership involvement is relatively minor overall, there can be no major differences between the parties in the data. And for certain of the items where leadership effects on member decisions are widespread, the importance distribution will also be similar across parties. For example, the factor relevance of party leaders is identical or very similar across parties for campaign finance reform, the Labor/HHS appropriations measure, the Patients' Bill of Rights, and the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. For these items, the basic configurations of leadership importance within each political party are reflected in the aggregate distributions of Table 5. For the remaining items, however, there are potentially informative differences by party.

First, for farm aid in 1999, leadership effects on member decision making were especially apparent on the Democratic side of the aisle. Here, among Democrats, the distribution was four major, one moderate, and one minor; for the GOP it was zero major, four moderate, and two minor. That year, Senate action on emergency farm assistance took the form of competing party proposals, with the Democrats trying to maximize the funding level and Republicans attempting to hold it down. The importance of farm assistance as a party matter was especially pronounced for the Democrats because Minority Leader Daschle hailed from an agricultural state that had been damaged economically by bad weather and plummeting commodity prices. Daschle, in particular, pushed the Clinton administration to embrace enhanced aid levels, and worked closely on the matter with prominent Democrats on the Agriculture Committee, especially ranking member Tom Harkin, D-Iowa. Democratic Senators from non-agricultural states, or representing constituencies with farm economies unaffected by the emergency, largely deferred to the parochial interests of their leaders. The more limited leadership effects apparent on the Republican side of the aisle largely resulted from GOP efforts not to be outflanked by the more aggressive tactics employed by the minority.

The cross-partisan evidence presented in Table 5 also masks differences by party on tax issues, including the two targeted reductions – the marriage penalty and estate tax repeals – and the more comprehensive cuts included in the FY2000 reconciliation package. For the estate tax, the distribution of leadership influence among Democrats included in my sample was three major, two moderate, and one minor, while for the majority Republicans the breakdown was zero major, one moderate, and five minor. On the marriage penalty, the leadership was a major factor for one

Democrat, of moderate importance for four, and minor for one, while for the GOP all six of the decisions were associated with little or no direct impact by party leaders. For the broader package of tax cuts in the FY 2000 reconciliation bill, leadership involvement was also somewhat more pronounced on the minority side of the aisle (three, three, and zero for the Democrats, as opposed to one, three, and two for the GOP). All three measures were Republican priorities that polled very well in conservative-leaning states, including those represented by Democratic members. On tax reduction proposals, such Democrats confronted significant cross-pressure between constituency concerns and the national party program, and Democratic leaders necessarily worked closely with them during the decision-making process. On the Republican side of the aisle, in contrast, tax reduction proposals are less likely to generate significant cross pressure and members more readily coalesced behind party proposals without much lobbying by their leaders.

Leadership effects were also somewhat more prevalent among the minority Democrats in our sample (as compared to the Republicans) on the Y2K measure. That bill was a fairly low-visibility measure aimed at resolving lawsuits occurring because of computer breakdowns associated with Y2K. Technology firms strongly supported the measure, but trial lawyers and consumer organizations were concerned that the liability limits might set a precedent for broader reforms. For the most part, member decisions were strongly shaped by group lobbying and a lawmaker's general approach to liability matters. As a result of the technical nature of the policy area, here members were especially likely to look to their colleagues for guidance. But party leaders also played a modest role, at least on the Democratic side of the aisle. For Democrats, the leadership was of moderate importance for four of the six members in my sample, while for Republicans leaders were largely a non-factor in making up their minds. At the time, the high-tech sector was viewed as a potential sources of new campaign finance support by both parties and GOP and Democratic leaders alike viewed the Y2K liability measure as a potential vehicle for building support for their party within the industry. For Republican members, there was little cross-pressure. But for some Democrats with close ties to the trial bar, there was some conflict among decision touchstones on the matter. As a result, their leaders needed to step in.

Interestingly, a very different pattern was apparent on the minimum wage. Here, leadership was a major factor for none of the Democrats, of moderate importance for three, and of minor importance for three. On the GOP side of the aisle, however, four of the six offices for which decision-making data are available rated their leaders as a major factor and for the remaining two it

was of moderate importance. While tax cut proposals generally poll well for the Republicans and create constituency-party challenges for red or purple state Democrats, proposals to increase the minimum wage tend to create political terrain that advantages Democrats. Indeed, throughout 1999-2000, Democratic members under the leadership of Edward Kennedy, D-Mass., repeatedly attempted to secure floor time for the consideration of a minimum wage hike. For a time, Majority Leader Lott and other Republicans were able to block such attempts, but by fall 1999 it was apparent that Kennedy had the leverage to force a vote. As a result, GOP leaders allowed consideration of two competing minimum wage hikes as part of chamber consideration of major bankruptcy reform legislation. One amendment was the Democratic proposal offered by Kennedy. The second was a GOP substitute offered by Pete Domenici, R-N.M., that included a less generous minimum wage hike and tax breaks for small businesses. While Democrats largely coalesced around the Kennedy proposal, there was considerable skepticism among Republicans about the GOP alternative. Many conservative members, for instance, opposed any increase in the minimum wage, even the streamlined proposal offered by Domenici. GOP leaders, however, viewed party support for the Domenici amendment as important for the reelection prospects of Republicans from politically moderate states in the midwest and northeast. As a result, they whipped recalcitrant conservatives and some wavering moderates within their rank, urging these members to stay with the party.

The somewhat more pronounced impact of party leaders on the minority side of the aisle, as well as the nature of the partisan asymmetries in leadership impact for certain of the issues, inform our understanding of the conditions associated with leadership influence in the vote choices of rank-and-file Senators. Simply put, leaders are especially important when there are significant *weaknesses* in the party's supporting coalition or the party is otherwise challenged by opposition from across the aisle or by actors outside the chamber. Party leaders may matter the most, in other words, not when parties appear to be especially strong, but instead in the presence of significant vulnerability or major threat.⁷

⁷ This is perhaps the central conclusion of Evans 2018a.

5. Other Measures Revisited

Still more perspective on the roles played by parties and leaders in the Senate can be gained by briefly reconsidering the measures and decisions where we found leaders to be only minor factors in roll call choice at the individual level – but where vote outcomes were intensely partisan and/or the rough indicators of Table 3 indicate substantial leadership engagement of some form.

Three of the items, for example, exhibited relatively minor leadership importance in member roll call choice and also did not score very highly on leadership engagement in Table 3 – but still produced very partisan voting outcomes on the floor. Included are Partial-Birth Abortions, the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the Hate Crimes amendment. Based on the 12 offices that were interviewed for each measure, these decisions were largely driven by mass opinion, organized groups, and a member's core policy beliefs. Like party leaders, the other Washington political actors included in our array of decision touchstones – the administration and Senate colleagues – also were largely non-factors on these items.

On partial-birth abortions, for instance, mass public opinion was a major factor for all 12 of the Senate offices in the sample, and groups were of major or moderate importance for seven. For nine of the 12, a member's core attitudes also were of major importance and for the remaining three core attitudes were of moderate importance. These distributions reflect the underlying politics of abortion. Ordinary citizens care about the issue, there is considerable organizational structure on both sides, and from the initial campaign for office onward members feel compelled to articulate consistent views. It comes as no surprise, then, that leaders, the White House, and Senate colleagues exert only limited sway over member decision making on reproductive rights. During Senate consideration of the partial-birth abortion proposal in 1999, Majority Leader Lott provided the lead sponsor, Rick Santorum, R-Penn., with important tactical assistance on the floor – for a time Santorum was outmaneuvered procedurally by Democrats Tom Harkin, Iowa, and Barbara Boxer, Calif. But beyond that assistance with the agenda, the roles played by the majority and minority leaderships were fairly limited.

For Senate ratification of the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty during the 106th Congress, mass opinion and the advocacy community were generally of moderate importance, but here the primary drivers appear to have been a member's core policy beliefs and (for Democrats) the Clinton White House. Indeed, of the twenty measures in our sample, the administration was most important for the test-ban vote, which reflects the enhanced role of the president in foreign policy. Personal

policy perspectives also played a major role in nine of the 12 offices in the sample for that issue and a moderate role in the remaining three. On the Republican side of the aisle, early in 1999 a group of ideological conservatives led by John Kyl, Ariz., and Jesse Helms, N.C., began meeting privately to build opposition to the treaty, arguing that it would substantially weaken U.S. defenses. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., a highly respected voice on foreign policy issues, was deeply skeptical about the treaty from the beginning, but as the unrest among party conservatives mounted he came out publicly against the deal on policy grounds. Democratic Leader Daschle and officials within the Clinton White House believed that they could force favorable Senate action by demanding a timely vote. Sensing that the administration lacked the support to win, Lott acquiesced to a unanimous consent agreement providing for Senate action. When vote counts indicated to the Democrats that they lacked sufficient support among Republicans to secure the necessary two-thirds to prevail, they attempted to obviate the unanimous consent agreement, which as a binding order of the Senate could only be accomplished via another UCA. Conservative Republicans objected to that request, the roll call occurred, and the treaty went down in defeat. But once again, the involvement of party leaders largely focused on timing and tactics, and on the majority side of the aisle even the procedural maneuvering mostly emanated from outside the leadership circle.

For the hate crimes amendment to the defense bill, 11 of the twelve offices interviewed for the matter viewed mass opinion in the state as of major or moderate importance. In a number of cases, there had been highly publicized attacks on individuals back home based on race or sexual orientation, which helped prime public attention toward the issue area. Here, the advocacy community did not appear to play as substantial a role as on partial-birth abortions. But as was also the case with reproductive rights, a member's core policy attitudes were cited as a major factor or of moderate importance for the bulk of the sample. Taken together, then, the three items – partial-birth abortions, the test-ban treaty, and hate crimes – illustrate how roll call partisanship can result in the absence of significant leadership activity or pressure. The implication? Again, much of what appears to be primarily partisan behavior in the Senate actually derives from constituency factors and group interests, as well as the divergent policy attitudes embraced by members of the two political parties.

Among the items in our sample for which leaders were seldom a major factor in roll call choice, several more are associated with *low* levels of party voting, but *high* levels of leadership engagement according to the Table 3 indicators – essentially the reverse of what we observed for

the previous three measures. Included are the Northeast Dairy Compact, legislation dealing with Africa trade and the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and Bankruptcy Reform. In each case, it turns out, the majority GOP leadership played a critical role on scheduling and tactics, which had consequences for the structure of floor action, but the direct impact of party leaders on the roll call choices of individual lawmakers was very limited. Member decisions about the dairy compact, for instance, were almost entirely driven by parochial constituency interests (milk producers and processors back home). The regional fight that resulted created significant challenges for Majority Leader Lott about if and when to schedule floor action, but beyond the substantial stress on the agenda the matter was largely driven by local concerns. Similar dynamics characterized Senate action on the Africa Trade/CBI matter. On bankruptcy reform, in contrast, the legislation became entangled with a range of unrelated issues, including Kennedy's attempt to increase the minimum wage and amendments that touched on abortion rights and gun control. Here, the ability of minority Democrats to offer nongermane amendments and otherwise seize control over the floor agenda created enormous tactical challenges for the majority leadership, and Lott took the lead in devising the party's strategic response. Once again, however, the impact of the leadership on the substantive positions formed by individual members was fairly limited; roll call choices largely were driven by constituent, group, and personal policy imperatives; and the votes that occurred were not particularly partisan.

Importantly, the presence of consequential leadership activity even when the vote choices of individual members are largely unaffected by leadership lobbying constitutes yet another cautionary note about the hunt for party effects in the Senate roll call record. Under the right conditions, and especially in the face of major challenges to the party program, leaders often do influence the process of position formation among individual lawmakers. Of the 240 discrete decisions under focus in this study, party leaders were a major factor on 27 and of moderate importance for 55. Although the bulk of party support on the floor results from the constituency and group imperatives shared by most members of a Senate party, even a modest impact for party leaders above and beyond such factors may be enough to sway close votes. And even in the absence of such direct leadership effects on roll call choice, Senate party leaders help structure the strategic context within the chamber, which in turn has consequences for outcomes on the floor.

6. Conclusion

My exploration of member decision making during the 106th Senate has several implications for scholarly understanding of roll call choice and the impact of parties and leaders in the legislative process. By all accounts, the majority leadership of the Senate lacks most of the procedural and other formal powers that have been granted to their counterparts in the House. Yet, for a nontrivial subset of floor items, the leadership was a significant factor in member position formation. Such issues tend to evoke common interests among members by party. And these shared concerns in turn create the possibility of substantial unity within one or both parties. But – and this is key – party leaders tend to become major factors in member position formation when the party faces significant coalition building challenges. Otherwise, leaders may not need to insert themselves in the process of member decision making. Absent coalition building vulnerabilities, in other words, there are incentives for leaders to step back and allow positions to form based on the constituency, group, and policy concerns that tend to unite the party anyway. Contrary to standard treatments of party influence in Congress (and here I include both the party cartel model of Cox and McCubbins and the conditional party government argument of Aldrich and Rohde), leadership engagement is not primarily a sign or indicator of party strength. Instead, leaders tend to matter the most when there are significant *weaknesses* in that party's supporting coalition.

More generally, for scholars to identify and explain party effects in Congress, we need to look beyond the standard indicators of member ideology and constituency interest and consider how the decision-making process looks from inside member offices. There is substantial evidence that floor decision making in both chambers of Congress, including the Senate, has become more polarized along partisan lines and leaders appear to be playing more active roles in the lawmaking process. For a nontrivial subset of issues and members, the evidence of this paper suggests that leaders can exert direct influence over roll call choices. But much of the partisan behavior we observe within the Senate is rooted in forces outside the hallways of Congress, and instead arises from the constituency and group attachments shared by members of a particular political party. Moreover, ample leadership activity that is potentially outcome consequential – the procedural maneuverings of Lott and Daschle during 1999-2000 are an illustration – may not directly affect the positions taken and votes cast by individual members. Unlike the standard approach to roll call research in the literature, the design embraced in this study allows us – in a tentative fashion – to

identify the independent impact of constituents, groups, leaders, and other actors on roll call choice, which in turn makes feasible a more precise delineation of party and leadership effects in Congress.

Table 1. Issue Sample, 106th Senate

Measure	Targeted Roll Calls
Y2K Liability	Passage
Steel Imports	Cloture
Patients' Bill of Rights	Passage and major amendments
Emergency Farm Aid	Main substitutes on FY 2000 Agriculture spending bill
FY 2000 Reconciliation	Passage and conference report
Northeast Dairy Compact	Cloture during FY 2000 Agriculture spending debate
Africa Trade/CBI	Passage
Minimum Wage	Kennedy and Domenici amendments on Bankruptcy bill
Bankruptcy Reform	Dodd and Feinstein credit amendments
Partial Birth Abortions	Harkin amendment and passage
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty	Passage
FY 2000 Labor/HHS	Passage and conference report
Campaign Finance Reform	Cloture on Daschle and Reid amendments
ESEA Reauthorization	Lieberman amendment and Democratic substitute
Hate Crimes	Kennedy amendment to FY 2001 Defense authorization bill
Marriage Penalty	Passage
Estate Tax Repeal	Passage
China/PNTR	Passage
Drug Re-importation	Jeffords-Dorgan amendment to FY 2001 Agriculture spending bill
Sugar Subsidy Repeal	McCain amendment to FY 2001 Agriculture spending bill

Table 2. Decision Observations

Republican Senators	Number of Observations
Spencer Abraham, Mich.	6
Susan Collins, Maine	10
Larry Craig, Idaho	4
Pete Domenici, N.M.	10
Peter Fitzgerald, Ill.	10
Bill Frist, Tenn.	10
Chuck Hagel, Neb.	7
Orin Hatch, Utah	1
Tim Hutchinson, Ark.	3
James Jeffords, Vt.	10
John Kyl, Ariz.	2
Richard Lugar, Ind.	8
Don Nickles, Okla.	4
Rick Santorum, Penn.	10
Jeff Sessions, Ala.	10
Gordon Smith, Ore.	6
Fred Thompson, Tenn.	4
George Voinovich, Ohio	5
Democratic Senators	Number of Observations
Joseph Biden, Del.	2
Jeff Bingaman, N.M.	9
Barbara Boxer, Calif.	9
Max Cleland, Ga.	9
Kent Conrad, N.D.	5
Byron Dorgan, N.D.	6
John Edwards, N.C.	9
Diane Feinstein, Calif.	6
Bob Graham, Fla.	8
Tom Harkin, Iowa	9
Carl Levin, Mich.	9
Joseph Lieberman, Ct.	9
Blanche Lincoln, Ark.	3
Jack Reed, R.I.	4
John D. Rockefeller, IV, W.V.	1
Paul Sarbanes, Md.	10
Robert Torricelli, N.J.	9
Paul Wellstone, Minn.	3
TOTAL	240

Table 3. Partisan context, by measure

Measure	Party Difference	Rep Leadership Involvement	Rep Whip Counts
Y2K Liability	63.8 ✓	Med	
Steel Imports	31.9 ✓	Low	
Patients' Bill of Rights	94.4 ✓	High	4
Emergency Farm Aid	68.9 ✓	Low/Med	
FY 2000 Reconciliation	84.1 ✓	High	1
Northeast Dairy Compact	3.2	Med/High	
Africa Trade/CBI	16.9	Medium	
Minimum Wage	90.9 ✓	Med/High	2
Bankruptcy Reform	50.7 ✓	Medium	
Partial Birth Abortions	68.13 ✓	Low/Med	
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty	88.5 ✓	Low/Med	
FY 2000 Labor/HHS	49.8 ✓	Med/High	
Campaign Finance Reform	84.4 ✓	Low/Med	
ESEA Reauthorization	63.0 ✓	Medium	3
Hate Crimes	72.4 ✓	Low	
Marriage Penalty	77.3 ✓	Med/High	
Estate Tax	69.7 ✓	Med/High	1
China/PNTR	1.7	Low/Med	
Drug Re-importation	26.3	Low/Med	
Sugar Subsidy Repeal	14.6	Low	

Table 4. Factor relevance, all measures

	Mass Constituents	Advocacy Groups	Party Leaders	Executive Branch	Core Attitudes	Colleagues
Major	76 (31.7)	118 (49.2)	27 (11.3)	18 (7.5)	117 (48.8)	46 (19.2)
Moderate	81 (33.8)	75 (31.3)	55 (22.9)	32 (13.3)	68 (28.3)	52 (21.7)
Minor	83 (34.6)	47 (19.6)	158 (65.8)	190 (79.2)	55 (22.9)	142 (59.2)

Table 5. Party leadership relevance, by measure

Measure	Major	Moderate	Minor
Y2K Liability	0	5	7
Steel Imports	0	1	11
Patients' Bill of Rights	5	6	1
Emergency Farm Aid	4	5	3
FY 2000 Reconciliation	4	6	2
Northeast Dairy Compact	0	0	12
Africa Trade/CBI	0	2	10
Minimum Wage	4	5	3
Bankruptcy Reform	0	0	12
Partial Birth Abortions	0	0	12
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty	0	1	11
FY 2000 Labor/HHS	1	4	7
Campaign Finance Reform	0	6	6
ESEA Reauthorization	5	6	1
Hate Crimes	0	0	12
Marriage Penalty	1	4	7
Estate Tax	3	3	6
China/PNTR	0	1	11
Drug Re-importation	0	0	12
Sugar Subsidy Repeal	0	0	12

Appendix: Interview Protocol and Coding

In deciding what questions to ask the respondents, I worked off of John Kingdon's research design in *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. Indeed, I found that his core questions still work remarkably well. A preliminary questionnaire was developed and pretested with two Senate chiefs of staff that I knew and trusted. I spoke with them at length and on repeated occasions about question wording, topics to address, the likelihood of candid responses, etc. After lengthy discussions, I settled on the following set of questions.

1. Was the vote on _____ a hard one, or fairly easy? How did [the Senator] go about making up his/her mind on the matter?

Typical follow-ups: Was the vote ever in doubt? When did he/she make up his/her mind? Was the Senator briefed by staff before the vote?

2. What was the view in the state on this one?

Typical follow-ups: Did you consider how the vote might be used in a campaign? Who in the state was paying attention? What was the mail like? Is there any concern that constituent views on this might evolve or change? What about public opinion on this matter nationally?

3. How about interest groups? Were organized groups a factor?

Typical follow-ups: What did the groups want? Did any lobbyists come in? Did they meet with the Senator or at the staff level? Were the groups mostly national or local? Was any grassroots mobilization undertaken? What else were the groups up to on this issue? How's your relationship generally with these groups?

4. Was the party leadership active on this issue? What role did the leadership play?

Typical follow-ups: Did your boss speak directly with Lott/Daschle, one of the whips, or another leader? Were party conference/caucus meetings conducted about this issue? Did they have much of an impact on your boss's thinking? Do you think the leadership influenced other Senate offices?

5. Did your boss talk to any other Senators about this vote — Senators outside of the leadership?

Typical follow-ups: What kind of impact did these conversations have? Was he/she lobbied personally by any other members? Were there any offices that he/she looked to for information or guidance? Were there any important contacts at the staff level with other offices?

6. How about the administration? Did the Clinton administration play a role in your boss's decision on this issue?

Typical follow-ups: Did he/she hear from anyone in the executive branch? What were these contacts about? Do you think the administration influenced other Senate offices?

Variable Coding Criteria

The following is a comprehensive delineation of the specific criteria used to code the factor relevance variables utilized in this paper. For each factor, certain of the criteria are not mutually exclusive and multiple criteria often are apparent in the interview notes. If multiple items are indeed apparent, rather than aggregate them in some way, I instead assigned the highest appropriate level. For example, if for the "Mass Constituents" factor both criteria H (associated with "moderate" importance) and O (associated with "major importance") are mentioned, the relevance level for this decision observation and factor is coded as "major."

Mass Constituents

Minor

- A. Not referenced
- B. Calculations about average or typical voter played no significant role
- C. Public not interested in or not paying attention, no local tie-in

Moderate

- D. Reference to a bloc or pockets of interested voters even if not large, separately from organizations or lobbyists
- E. Some grassroots interest, but not extensive or clearly orchestrated
- F. Influential people in communities paying attention, that is, elites who other people pay attention to
- G. Public is inattentive on this bill, but could be engaged by issue in future, perhaps in a campaign
- H. Senator conducted “events” on the issue or reference to light media coverage
- I. Reference to general constituency viewpoint (e.g., state is pro export or pro trade), or item as being good or bad for state

Major

- J. Significant concern to large number or substantial bloc of voters
- K. Reference in detail the views of different voter blocs
- L. Mention that large numbers of constituents are affected by or care about the issue
- M. Numerous conversations occurred about it between voters and the Senator, or heard a lot from back home
- N. Reference to extensive and significant grassroots activity
- O. Mention as an important “voter” issue in past or future campaign
- P. Reference to base being activated or caring a lot about the matter
- Q. Reference to significant ads, media buys or substantial press coverage about the item in the state; or to important “focal” events occurring in the state
- R. Poll data referenced and emphasized

Interest Groups and Advocacy Organizations

Minor

- A. Not referenced at all
- B. Lobbying activities described as very limited, perhaps a few calls or less
- C. Only sporadic astro-turf tactics occurred and were discounted as such

Moderate

- D. Mention relevance of issue to groups firms, industries, or another organized constituency
- E. Lobbying occurred, but not extensive
- F. Lobbying occurred, but contacts primarily were as part of more general visits to the office (e.g., group “lobbying days”)
- G. Senator or staff “took some calls” from group representatives, separate from grassroots contacts, but little more
- H. Strong organized interest that was very narrow (e.g., one relatively small firm)
- I. Reference to group activity, but without much pressure or “not pushing it much”

Major

- J. Reference significant group or organizational presence in state or national constituency
- K. Politics of issue largely described in group terms
- L. Heavy lobbying took place
- M. Member worked closely with advocacy community in crafting alternatives or planning strategy
- N. Referenced significant interaction due to committee or other leadership role

Party Leadership

Minor

- A. No reference
- B. Heard nothing from leadership

- C. Not a leadership issue, or interacted with member of leadership purely outside his/her leadership role
- D. Leadership knows where we are in this area, perhaps only sounded out
- E. Leadership only mentioned regarding procedural tactics that did not affect Member's substantive deliberations

Moderate

- F. Referenced as a leadership issue
- G. Discussion in caucus referenced as noteworthy or a factor
- H. Conversations about bill occurred at member or staff level with leaders or leadership staff, but pressure not referenced as significant
- I. Leadership crafting of agenda or procedural situation mentioned as noteworthy and had substantive implications (e.g., provided political cover)

Major

- J. Significant pressure exerted by leadership on member, either directly or throughout staff
- K. Senator worked closely with leadership on the matter, or simply deferred to leadership requests
- L. Discussion in caucus referenced as a major part of decision-making process
- M. Leadership pressured the member not to offer a relevant amendment that would have affected substantive deliberations
- N. The electoral interests of co-partisans "in cycle" were a major concern

Executive Branch/Administration

Minor

- A. No reference
- B. Nothing from administration
- C. We don't pay attention to them on these issues, the administration doesn't come to us
- D. Received correspondence from administration, but not referenced as noteworthy

Moderate

- E. Some contact from administration staff, heard from them
- F. Referenced relatively routine interactions at the staff or agency/department level
- G. Administration participation in caucus meetings referenced
- H. Administration factored into voting decision as a strategic consideration (e.g., a threatened veto that altered the substantive calculus, or member efforts to strengthen the administration's leverage or resolve)

Major

- I. Information from or persuasive efforts by the administration referenced as a significant part of the decision
- J. President, White House staff, or cabinet secretary communicated directly with and lobbied the Senator
- K. Administration presentations during caucus meetings referenced as a significant factor in the decision

Core Attitudes

Minor

- A. Not alluded to in any way

Moderate

- B. Mentioned general position or broader attitude in passing or after other factors and in a manner that did not indicate emphasis
- C. Related decision to group interest that is central to Senator's broader policy agenda (e.g., pro-labor or pro working people)
- D. Reference to member being comfortable or uncomfortable with the position for policy reasons
- E. Mention importance of outside policy experts

Major

- F. Clear ideological or other policy dimensional reference that was emphasized (e.g., importance of “Freedom to Farm” approach)
- G. Emphasized relationship of issue to an attitude, value or principle that matters to the Senator (e.g., pro-trade, pro-growth)
- H. Decision directly related to an important, longstanding policy position (e.g., pro-choice or pro-life)
- I. Decision closely related to a policy priority of the Senator

Senate Colleagues

Minor

- A. No reference, or reference to being cue givers rather than takers
- B. Nothing beyond typical, mostly routine conversations

Moderate

- C. Referenced noteworthy communications with other offices at the staff level
- D. Referenced Senator speaking with a colleague about the issue or mentioning a colleague without substantial emphasis
- E. Position of a colleague is “generally considered” by member on these issues
- F. Worked on relevant task force, but individual members not referenced by name
- G. Worked with colleague on minor part of bill, or worked closely with that colleague on the issue in a prior Congress

Major

- H. Deferred to a colleague
- I. Looked to a colleague as an important cue or for significant guidance
- J. Senator knew he/she would be “with” a particular colleague on the vote
- K. Worked closely with a colleague on a closely related substantive alternative
- L. Worked on a relevant task force and non-leadership members referenced by name
- M. Lobbied personally by a colleague and gave serious consideration to the persuasive effort
- N. Referenced Senator as speaking with “many” or “a lot” of colleagues about the issue

References

- Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Aldrich, John, et al. 2008. "Party and Constituency in the U.S. Senate, 1933-2004." In *Why Not Parties? Party Effects in the United States Senate*, eds. Nathan W. Monroe, Jason M. Roberts, and David W. Rohde. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bauer, Raymond A., Ithiel De Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter. 1963. *American Business and Public Policy*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, and Beth L. Leech. 2009. *Lobbying and Policy Change*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Campbell, Andrea, Gary Cox, and Mathew McCubbins. 2002. "Agenda Power in the U.S. Senate, 1977-1986." In *Party, Process and Political Change in Congress*, eds. David Brady and Mathew McCubbins. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 146-65.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Curry, James M. 2015. *Legislating in the Dark: Information and Power in the House of Representatives*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Den Hartog, Chris, and Nathan W. Monroe. 2011. *Agenda Setting in the U.S. Senate*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Disch, Lisa. 2012. "Democratic Representation and the Constituency Paradox." *Perspectives on Politics* 10, 599-616.
- Evans, C. Lawrence. 2001a. *Leadership in Committee*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Evans, C. Lawrence. 2001b. "Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics," in L. Dodd and B. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered, 7th ed.* Washington: Congressional Quarterly.
- Evans, C. Lawrence. 2002. "How Senators Decide: An Exploration," in B. Oppenheimer, ed., *U.S. Senate Exceptionalism*. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press.
- Evans, C. Lawrence. 2018a. *The Whips: Building Party Coalitions in Congress*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

- Evans, C. Lawrence. 2018b. "U.S. Senators and the Act of Representation: Concepts and Measures," presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois.
- Fenno, Richard F. 1978. *Homestyle: House Members in their Districts*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Hall, Richard L. 1996. *Participation in Congress*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander, Matto Mildemberger, and Leah C. Stokes. 2019. "Legislative Staff and Representation in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 113, 1-18.
- Kingdon, John W. 1973. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Koger, Gregory. *Filibuster*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lee, Frances. 2009. *Beyond Ideology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lee, Frances. 2016. *Insecure Majorities*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lee, Frances E., and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. 1999. *Sizing Up the Senate*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mansbridge, Jane J. 2003. "Rethinking Representation." *American Political Science Review* 97, 515-28.
- Matthews, Donald R., and James A. Stimson. 1975. *Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-making in the U.S. House of Representatives*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Miler, Kristina C. 2010. *Constituency Representation in Congress: The View from Capitol Hill*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pitkin, Hanna F. 1972. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rohde, David W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Salisbury, Robert H., and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1981. "Congressman as Enterprise," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 559-76.
- Schiller, Wendy J. 2000. *Partners and Rivals: Representation in U.S. Senate Delegations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sinclair, Barbara. 1989. *The Transformation of the U.S. Senate*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Sinclair, Barbara. 1995. *Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Smith, Steven S. 2007. *Party Influence in Congress*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Steven S. 2014. *The Senate Syndrome: The Evolution of Procedural Warfare in the Modern U.S. Senate*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Smith, Steven S. and Gerald Gamm. 2001. "The Evolution of Senate Party Organization and Leadership: An Overview," presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.

Smith, Steven S. and Gerald Gamm. 2002. "Emergence of the Modern Senate: Party Organization, 1937-2002," presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Mass.

Therriault, Sean. 2013. *The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in the Senate*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wallner, James. 2017. *On Parliamentary War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.